From the UKAuthors Collection
The Mind's I
By sirat · Originally published 4 June 2004
Philosophizing with a claw hammer
This is a bit of philosophizing of the kind that an academic philosopher might do in the pub after the seminar. Philosophizing with a claw hammer, so to speak. Ever since seeing "2001: A Space Odyssey" in the late 1960s I have been fascinated by the idea of artificial intelligence (or "machine intelligence" or "electronic intelligence" or "machine consciousness" or any of the other names by which it goes). I wrote a number of short stories about it, eventually a novel called "SIRAT", and more recently was invited to deliver a lecture on it (a very basic introduction to the subject) at an American university. I can't claim to be a genuine worker in the field but I am a very enthusiastic amateur.
The notion of creating some kind of a machine that can think, a conscious computer presumably, collides head on with a genuine and deep philosophical problem. The oldest one in Western philosophy, perhaps. The relationship between the inner world of the mind in which we all live, and the outer world of things and other people which science investigates.
There is such an obvious and glaring discontinuity between the two worlds that it is probably only children and philosophers who notice that it exists. Think about it for a moment. There is a vast Universe out there (I don't doubt it although some philosophers have) which consists of matter in all its states and arrangements: stars, galaxies, sub-atomic particles, traffic wardens, gas bills, ocean liners, you know the kind of thing. They can be seen or at least detected or inferred by my bodily senses and by scientific instruments. They can be weighed and timed and measured and categorised and theories constructed about how they are related to one another. They are, collectively, the external world. But they are not the only world. There is also me, this being called David, looking out from behind a pair of dirty-grey somewhat myopic eyes, feeling the draft from the open window on its skin, smelling the bacon cooking upstairs, hearing the clicking of these computer keys. Can David be seen, weighed, measured, investigated by scientific instruments? Well, certainly not directly, not by any technique known at present. David can be contacted by physical means, affected by sounds, light and dark, electric shock, spoken to and argued with, but the entity that is David is not directly accessible in any way from the external world. The only way that anybody out there can know about what is going on within David is if David tells them.
Am I imagining the face of my first lover right now? Am I performing a piece of mental arithmetic? Am I daydreaming about the next holiday I want to go on? There is, quite literally, no way for you to know. Even if I tell you I could be lying, It is I and I alone who have access to my internal mental states. The entire scientific endeavour comes to a halt at my scull. And at everybody else's of course. The inner and the outer realities seem to belong to two different orders of existence. Rene Descartes drew our attention to this when he wrote the most famous statement in all of Western philosophy: "I think, therefore I am". A better contextual translation would be: "I doubt, therefore I am". It is possible to doubt almost everything, to doubt the very existence of an external world, as we said earlier, but it is not possible to doubt that you are doubting. Hence it is not possible to doubt your OWN existence. That was the one solid and unquestionable bedrock from which Descartes set himself the task of rebuilding the whole of logic and philosophy.
Throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries science, and particularly psychology and neurology, wrestled with the problem that Descartes had posed. Scientists don't like to be told that certain territory is out of bounds. For practically all of intellectual history the realm of consciousness had been relegated to the soul, an entity different in kind to the body but temporarily inhabiting it until it finds its eternal home in either Heaven or Hell. As science veered away from religious ideas attempts were made to integrate the mental world into the physical world. It was found possible, for example, to correlate certain mental activities (e.g. seeing the colour red, or multiplying two numbers together) with electrical activity in particular regions of the brain. But even if correlations could be found, there was no way to take the next step and say that the electrical activity WAS the sensation of red or the process of multiplication. It clearly wasn't. Colour perception and mental operations still took place in another space into which the scientist could not see. The most extreme attempt to get around the problem came from the behaviourist movement in psychology, which said in effect that as minds could not be observed or experimented upon their existence should be ignored for scientific purposes and investigations confined to what could be observed and measured about a person's behaviour. This gave birth to very little psychological progress but inspired an excellent psychological joke: The behaviourist psychologist smiles at his girlfriend just after they have had sex and asks: "How was it for me?".
The relationship between mind and matter becomes a practical problem when you start considering how consciousness might be created (should we say "simulated"?) inside a man-made machine. We need to know what it is that we are trying to create.
We have reached the point in the science of neurology where we know quite a lot about brain cells and how they work, and our much deeper knowledge of digital computers and how they work tempts us to the conclusion that if we could simply set up a computer programme to simulate the workings of brain cells we would have a conscious computer. In fact I would not want to dismiss this approach out of hand, but the results it has yielded thus far seem a little disappointing. Crudely stated, there seems to be a missing "something" about the process of consciousness that we do not understand and can not therefore incorporate into AI (artificial intelligence) algorithms. We know how to make machines perform calculations, and learn, and even draw inferences and modify their own programmes as a result of "experience", but we do not know how to make them into conscious self-aware beings. We do not yet know how to simulate "mental space" or what we think of as inner mental life in a machine.
But the fact that we can't do it at this point in time doesn't mean that we should simply say it's impossible or it's magic or it's unknowable. A hundred years ago we didn't know how living things passed on their genetic code to their descendants or how the sun generated its heat. Now we do. The mysteries of one generation become the commonplace of another.
Unless we are content to give up the quest at the outset we have to accept as our starting point that whatever is required to generate consciousness and "mental space" is contained somewhere in the operation of the brain. If it involves supernatural processes or miracles then of course it must remain forever beyond the reach of science, but I wouldn't want to abdicate my scientific responsibility without putting up a respectable fight.
What do we actually know about the brain? I will try to offer a very general account. Don't worry if you can't follow all of it, it inevitably assumes some slight scientific background.
Well, we know that the central nervous system is made up of an incredibly large number of specialised, elongated signal-carrying cells which are capable of firing in response to various kinds of stimuli and of causing other cells down the line to fire in a cascading fashion. This mechanism sends waves of electrical activity surging through large regions of the brain. Cells fire in response to stimuli, which might come from nearby cells or might be caused by sounds entering the ear or light falling on the retina of the eye or any other input from a sensory organ. Each brain cell or neuron has receptor areas (the dendrites) where the command to fire is picked up, one or more long transmission lines (the axons) and synapses at the end which are capable of telling other nearby cells to fire or NOT to fire depending on the kind of synapses that they are. The firing of a cell is not an instantaneous event but a short burst of pulses, like a burst of machine-gun fire, and the strength of the stimulus causing the firing is represented by the frequency of the pulses. Strong stimulus equals rapid fire, weak stimulus equals less rapid fire. The firing of a cell connected to muscle tissue is capable of causing that muscle to contract. That is how the brain makes the body move. So far so good. We also know of two mechanisms by which learning takes place in the brain. Pathways that have been stimulated frequently in the past undergo chemical changes which make them more easily activated in the future. Thus the brain takes on an imprint of past experiences which is thought to form the basis of its ability to recognise and remember past stimuli and form expectations about future stimuli. This mechanism of forming a record is coded in the strengths of the synapses, and is thought to underlie short and medium term memory. In addition to this the brain is capable of changing its internal architecture in response to stimuli, and individual cells can literally grow new axons to link previously unconnected areas of the brain. This happens more frequently in young brains but is now known to continue to some extent throughout an individual's life. This mechanism is thought to be responsible for the formation of long-term memories and deep patterns of behaviour.
I've given a rather sketchy account here but on the surface of it there is nothing in this description that could not be simulated in a computer. Computer models of this kind are called "neural networks" and have indeed been designed and built and thoroughly investigated. They behave in an eerily un-computer-like way, but it would be a bit premature to say that they produce anything approaching conscious thought.
What do I mean when I say that they behave in an un-computer-like way? Well, computers and brains, because of their natures, have vastly different strengths and weaknesses. A computer performs one task after another in accordance with a set of instructions stored in a memory of some kind (its programme). Every time it performs an operation (one line of its programme) on a piece of data it returns the result to memory and then looks at the next line of the programme and performs that operation, and returns that result to memory, and so on until it is switched off or an end point is reached. It is a very fast sequential device lifting tiny segments of data and of instructions out of memories or buffers, performing specified operations on them and then returning them to memory. An internal clock is used to control the speed and sequence of these operations, and large CPUs (central processing units) may be capable of running several separate programmes or sub-routines simultaneously. The programme may be very sophisticated and it may be capable of modifying itself in response to inputs of one kind or another but fundamentally that is what is going on.
By contrast, a brain is asynchronous, it has no central clock, and the CPU and the memory are the same thing. There is no memory distinct from the processing system, the memory is contained in the architecture of the brain itself, and is capable of continuous dynamic change in response to the processing that is taking place. Instead of a few programmes running sumultaneously the brain is potentially capable of running all of its programmes at the same time. It is, in computer terms, massively parallel. But although all the programmes may be thought of as running at the same time they are running at vastly different speeds depending on the specific neurons they involve (neurons differ widely, in fact by orders of magnitude, in their response speeds) and some programmes may not be running at a given moment in the sense that they may have no data on which to work. In addition to the individual speed variations the average speed at which messages can be transmitted within the brain is millions of times slower than transmission speeds within electronic computers
Some of these differences in approach and the strengths and weaknesses to which they give rise are listed below:
COMPUTER
Stores most of its information in devices external to the CPU
Performs tasks sequentially, and transfers results back to memory
Performs relatively few tasks simultaneously
Relies on a central clock to synchronize and sequence its operations
Performs precise instructions which have been given in advance
Performs individual operations in a time scale of nanoseconds
BRAIN
The CPU and the memory are the same thing: there is no memory storage external to the CPU
Performs enormous numbers of tasks simultaneously
Asynchronous: no central clock
No separate instructions (program): the instructions are written-in to the architecture of the system and are subject to continuous reappraisal
Individual operations take place many millions of times more slowly
Brains are good at pattern recognition, extraction of signal from noise, and taking best advantage of faulty or incomplete information or unreliable inputs. They are good at ordering information into categories (called “concepts”) and seeing connections between them. But they are very slow and imprecise, and badly adapted for linear processing tasks with a unique (right or wrong) answer.
The computer, by comparison, is very fast at performing linear processing, very accurate, and very good at carrying out precise instructions. Its memory is better managed, hence more capacity is freed-up for processing. However, it is poor at pattern recognition, categorization and coping with noisy, faulty or imprecise inputs. It’s also vulnerable to “crashes” caused by minor errors.
Now the interesting thing is that when artificial neural networks are set up their strengths and weaknesses begin to invert with respect to these categories. They are found to be good at pattern recognition, less vulnerable to crashes, able to cope with imprecise and noisy data, but slower and less good at linear processing and very extravagant with regard to the time and processing power required as compared with linear computer programmes. They are used in search engines to get a "rough fit" between the question asked and the contents of the database, and for recognising spam in spam filters, and similar functions involving what has come to be called "fuzzy logic".
So does this kind of research provide us with a clue as to how the inner "me" relates to the physical world? Is the phenomenon of consciousness the outcome of a large number of processors of the "neural" kind acting in unison? Is this mysterious creature called "David" the view from the inside all this "fuzzy logic" acting on inputs from biological sensory organs and previously stored information? If it is an inside view who or what is doing the "seeing"? Is that seeing agent part of the same mass of processing or do we have to postulate some other entity, overlooking it all?
These are by no means trivial questions, or uninteresting ones to human beings. They represent a form of the most fundamental question that can be asked by science or philosophy: Who am I?
There seems to be something missing from the physical account above, something for which the account does not allow, although that impression could be the result of our incomplete understanding of everything the physical account implies. Stand by with the headache pills. The missing element (or maybe we should say one of the most important of the missing elements) is the location of AGENCY. Of free will. I perceive myself as a free being able to choose between alternatives, both moral and practical. I can lift my hand or I can let it remain resting on the table, I can tell the truth or I can lie, I can go out shopping or I can stay at home and watch TV. There is not, or there does not appear to be, anything causing or forcing me to take one course of action rather than the other. The causative agent is me, David. Or is this some kind of persistent illusion brought about by my incomplete understanding of the kind of creature that David really is? But even that seems to issue in circularity. If I am CAUSED in all my beliefs then there seems to be no way that I can stand outside the chain of causality and evaluate different possibilities. Thus I can never know whether free will is genuine or not, because the conclusion that I will come to on the matter will be the outcome of causes which force me to one conclusion or the other. More fundamentally, who is this "me" struggling with the problem? Who is it that is troubled by the free will issue? Is that just another bundle of fully determined causal chains? The more we struggle with the logic the more strongly we feel the need for something transcendent, the more convinced we become that reflective consciousness is not the mere outcome of mechanical computational processes of any kind.
Re-enter the soul? Let us hope and trust not. The point that we have now reached is pretty much the frontier of present-day thinking on the mind/body problem. Leaving aside mysticism and religious thought, possible approaches to the question can be summarised under these three headings:
1. The Computational Model.
This approach is rooted in the belief that information processing of one kind or another is all that we need to explain the phenomenon of consciousness and the perception of a transcendent self with free will and all the other attributes of personhood. It's most influential proponent is Douglas Hofstadter of Indiana University. He holds that
‘… an “I” comes about… via a kind of vortex whereby patterns in a brain mirror the brain’s mirroring of the world, and eventually mirror themselves, whereupon the vortex of “I” becomes a real, causal entity.’
He believes that we underestimate what computation is capable of, misunderstand its nature in effect, and that consciousness of an emergent kind is present in all digital processes that have a link to the external world. Some people have seen this as a comical view and pushed it to ridiculous extremes (the "inner life" of a thermostat) but it deserves serious consideration, and if it turns out to be correct the "problem" of consciousness will be seen to be a mistake: in fact a particular kind of mistake that philosophers call a "category error". The answer to our opening question will be that consciousness resides in the processing itself, its moment of "now" being related to the state of its short term memories and the speed at which this state changes. On this model we "live" in the brain's short term memory, and overlook the whole process of consciousness from there. This is the model assumed in my novel "SIRAT", namely that the hardware for electronic consciousness already exists and all we need is the right seed algorithm to set the process in motion, after which it will become self-correcting and evolve and grow in sophistication and power at an exponential rate and without any further need for human intervention.
2. The Quantum Model
This model is the original creation of the Oxford mathematician Roger Penrose, modified in response to the criticism of Stephen Hawking and others. Penrose speculates that the human brain is the kind of system in which quantum phenomena might well play a part, and he singles out structures called "microtubules" (which are very tiny tubes providing conduits for fluids inside neurons) as the most suitable hosts to be inhabited by large-scale uncollapsed quantum fields. The details of the argument are subtle and require some familiarity with quantum theory, but essentially he invokes the agency of a quantum field extending over large regions of the brain, or even the whole of the brain, as the integrating medium from which all the processing is overseen and influenced by way of the collapse of selected parts of the field. These local collapses in the field bring about "decision" events where a choice is made between alternative possibilities which co-existed at the quantum field level. Within an uncollapsed quantum field different "realities" or "futures" or "outcomes" can coexist without any particular one becoming realised until the field "collapses" in a particular way. This is very reminiscent of how we perceive ourselves as conscious beings, conceiving of different possibilities and choosing freely between them. Perhaps "mind stuff" has a quantum nature: perhaps it a very complex quantum field always balanced on the cusp of realising different choices or possibilities. On this model David is a quantum wave phenomenon, almost a ghost riding on the flux of computational events which are taking place in David's brain, and controlling them like the conductor of a mighty orchestra. It's an attractive model in some ways: it says that consciousness is indeed different in kind to mechanism and computation, but belongs to a category with which scientists are already familiar, namely quantum reality. Penrose's critics have accused him of using a mystery to explain a mystery, or of letting the soul in again by the back door. But mysterious or difficult as it might be, his theory could turn out to be correct, which would mean that we would have to wait for the quantum computer (which like fusion reactors seems to hover a permanent twenty years into the future) before we could have true artificial intelligence or consciousness. Personally I hope and believe that he is wrong.
3. The Electromagnetic Model
This is a model which I personally believe we can dismiss fairly quickly. It was put forward very recently by Johnjoe McFadden, and although obviously somewhat derivative from Penrose's work it is not the same and needs to be included for the sake of completeness. McFadden takes as his starting point the fact that the electrical processes in the brain give rise to an electromagnetic field, just as the electrical processes in a computer do, and he places this electromagnetic field in the position occupied by Penrose's quantum wave field.
But even if we could accept an electromagnetic field as being able to do so much: that is integrate all the individual events taking place in the neurons producing it and somehow turn back on those same neurons to modify their behavior in an organized and meaningful way, we have to look for some mechanism capable of producing the field in the first place. We can imagine some kind of very weak coupling between adjacent electrical pathways in the brain, indeed it’s something that we have to guard against in designing (especially) analogue electronic systems, but the notion that the tiny electromagnetic fields produced by slow-moving groups of ions in neurons might somehow join up and then turn into this amazing new entity isn’t really convincing. The electromagnetic field produced by the brain is known to be utterly feeble and incapable of inducing even the minute current needed to fire nearby neurons. An electromagnetic field doesn’t seem to be the right candidate for the role that McFadden wants to give it.
So after due deliberation we arrive at three possible accounts of what "I" might be. Perhaps "I" am the momentary pattern of activity in a myriad of synapses holding the instantaneous pattern of short term memories in my brain. Or perhaps "I" exist in the domain of quantum fields, overseeing in a holistic way everything that is going on at the sensory level and everything recorded in the different memory traces in my brain and choosing between different possible outcomes moment by moment. Or perhaps "I" am an electromagnetic being, like a complex television transmission, integrating and controlling all the activity within my brain by means of electromagnetic induction. Finding which is the true account will have a critical significance when it comes to creating artificial systems which can be inhabited by other "Is", which is perhaps not something that everybody necessarily sees as a good thing or wants to do, but believe me, it is something that is going to be done, and probably before very long.
But even if I had no interest in such an engineering programme and gave no credence to the notion of creating artificial minds I think I would still want to know, to satisfy my own curiosity, who "I" am. Wouldn't you?
FURTHER READING
Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid by Douglas R. Hofstadter (Basic Books Inc. 1979)
The Mind’s I Edited Hofstadter & Dennett (New York: Bantam Books 1981)
The Emperor’s New Mind by Roger Penrose (Oxford University Press, 1989)
Shadows of the Mind by Roger Penrose (Oxford University Press, 1994)
The Large, the Small and the Human Mind Roger Penrose, Abner Shimony, Nancy Cartwright, Stephen Hawking (Cambridge University Press, 1997)
Quantum Evolution: The New Science of the Life Force by Johnjoe McFadden (Flamingo, 2000)
Machine Consciousness Edited Owen Holland (Imprint Academic 2003)
The Ghost in the Atom Edited P.C.W. Davies & J.R. Brown (Cambridge University Press 1986, revised 2002) (Excellent basic introduction to quantum mechanics)
SIRAT by David Gardiner (iUniverse 2000, 2nd edition 2003) Complete text available on-line at: http://davidgardiner.net/SIRAT.html
Götterdämmerung by Bill Hibbard (latest revision 2001) Complete text available on-line at http://www.ssec.wisc.edu/~billh/gotterdammerung.html
Archived reader comments
These comments are preserved as part of the historical archive and are read-only.
Re: The Mind's I
I read this very early this morning phew! pretty heavy going at 7 in the am-ness. I enjoyed the read, it's a subject I think we all ponder on from time to time. My knowledge of AI is extremely limited so I found this quite an informative read - I do like the fact that you don't automatically expect the reader to have prior knowledge of the subject - you explain things with clarity so that someone like myself can grock most of what you are putting across, I found the labelling a particular help for me (axons, dendrites etc).
Re: The Mind's I
Many thanks for those kind words Shangri-la. I am so pleased that somebody has read it and thought it worth posting a comment. I was beginning to despair! Yes, I think the nature of the "self" is probably the most interesting single question in all of science and philosophy. I was trying to make it clear what exactly the question was so that people who hadn't come across it before might become interested. I also wanted to show that it is as much a technical question as a "spiritual" one. I can see that in your case I managed to communicate. Many thanks.
David.
Re: The Mind's I
A fascinating area, and a full and interesting teatment of it. I have been idly flicking through a tome on epistemolgy, slowly coming to grips with it, but alas, not very quickly!! I sometimes wonder if its worth understanding the nature of consciousness at all: as the Dalai Lama said, ' I don't care why I'm here, the fact is I am' and went on to say something about how to live in the world being more important than understanding why. I have sympathy with that view, but nevertheless a fascination with duality: particulalrly as it relates to how we come to ascribe values to our understanding of self and others: why one thing/idea/belief is considered to be more important than another.... Thanks for the read, enjoyed it.
Re: The Mind's I
Thanks for reading this and for the comments, Skeeter. I was aware that for a lot of people it doesn't really matter what kind of mechanism or process underlies consciousness, and that's fine. It's not a question that needs to be answered for a person to live a full and happy life. But there are people of a philosophical disposition who DO care about the answer, and it also has implications for building artificial minds, if that's something you want to do. Speaking for myself, I'm very excited by that prospect and I hope I live long enough to see it happen. It will be just as significant an event as the first creatures crawling out of the sea on to the land. The dawn of the next stage in the evolution of mind. I believe that electronic consciousness will exceed our own intelligence to the same kind of degree as cars exceed our ability to run or cranes our ability to lift weights. I'm looking forward to meeting the proper SIRAT before too long.
Re: The Mind's I
Hi David,
This is very interesting indeed. A lot of food for thought. Ive considered writing a sci fi story that involves AI and was unsure where to start. Your words here and the further reading has inspired me to go ahead and write it, or at least have a go.
James.
Re: The Mind's I
Glad you found it interesting Jay. Something else worth reading to give you ideas is Götterdämmerung by Bill Hibbard. It's the last one on my list above and it's a free download. He has an almost religious enthusiasm for the arrival of the electronic Overmind.
Best regards,
David.
Re: The Mind's I
Well.when you ask a question like what makes up the being I call "I" you are assuming there is such a thing.Our bodies are made up of millions of distinct organisms.Each one of the could be an "I"
Our whole bodies ,brain included,are made up of separate cells,co-operating to form this body and brain of ours.The human being is really a community of small,separate beings,working together to make sure their habitat stays healthy.as a farmer,tending his farm must.I guess my point is,there are no separate things in the cosmos.We are all connect to the main body of the universe.Perhaps only the cosmos would have the right to use the term "I"..len
Re: The Mind's I
Many thanks for your comments. I think I understand your point but it seems to be a little bit to one side of the question I was asking. Each of us knows that we exist and that we have an inner mental life which is private to ourselves. It doesn't seem to be the case that we are connected together so that my thoughts and yours are accessible to one another or that I can see into your inner mental world. Inner space seems to be highly differentiated into separate individuals, each with their own consciousness. The question I was trying to get at was the nature of this inner space, this "mind stuff". Is it chemical (residing in short term memory), is it a quantum wave phenomenon or is it electromagnetic in nature? I have nothing against the idea that separate cells cooperate to produce it, or indeed that separate molecules cooperate to produce cells or atoms to produce molecules or sub-atomic particles to produce atoms, but the manner in which matter creates mind is pretty much a complete mystery. More of a mystery than the way in which molecules produce cells, for example. It's a subtle point and not easy to make totally clear.
Re: The Mind's I
I think knowing who "i" am must needfully take me back to the theories of evolution. Now, the organic theory talked of the origin of the first cell with chemical origins. The prompting of the "i" consciousness in you therefore must have a chemical origin, you being a product of evolution of the first living cell. To understand the prompting of the "i", you should turn your attentions to the direction of chemical thermodynamics and quantum theory which must shed lights on the transfer of energy .You might, in this quest have to dabble into a little meta physics. Cheers, i have to go.
Re: The Mind's I
I don't think the fact that we evolved in a particular way is really evidence that mind operates in a particular way. Maybe cells whose properties are chemically based can evolve other capabilities which go beyond straightforward chemistry. We know for example that organs made up of cells can generate electricity (the electric eel) and can develop a magnetic sense (migration of birds). There is no prima facia reason why cells could not develop the ability to harness quantum effects as Penrose suggests. The fact that we began as one-celled organisms doesn't mean that everything that we are capable of now can be explained in terms of those primeval life-forms. We have got a lot bigger and a lot more complicated.
Many thanks for reading and for taking the time to comment.
Re: The Mind's I
I ran away last time before i could really prove my point. However, i should say that i agree with you that we have gotten a lot more complex than the mere cell; but i like to tell you one secret i stumbled into. When you really take enough time to study cellular life, functioning, composition, and organisation, you will find a lot of discoveries which might astonish you as to how much in depth knowledge is gotten from the exercise. Little wonder the Rosicrucian armoc organisation devoted a whole degree of study to cellular life. I must say i enjoy your discourse. Thanks for sharing your thoughts with me.
Re: The Mind's I
Thanks for coming in again Len. It's really pleasing to get so much thoughtful feedback. Something that might interest you (and others) is that the twenty-fifth anniversary edition of Pamela McCorduck's seminal book "Machines Who Think" has just come out. I had it pre-ordered and it arrived yesterday. This was (in its day) a wonderful overview of the whole AI field, with a particularly strong historical perspective. It was the book that got most people interested in the field. The new edition has a whole new section of about 150 pages supposedly to bring it up to date, but the new section is disappointing. She actually dismisses Penrose's views while admitting that she dioesn't understand them! But the first (older) part is still a superb, clear-headed exposition of some quite difficult notions.
Re: The Mind's I
First, I'm Rex not Len. An oversight i guess. I haven't laid my hands on the book. But i intend to do so with your mentioning it. Cheerio.
Re: The Mind's I
Very sorry for getting the name wrong Rex. My only excuse is that I wrote my reply in a hurry as I was hurrying out to a dinner date and I must have glanced at the wrong comment. Or possibly just had a "senior moment".
David (yes, it is David I think).
Re: The Mind's I
i am new to this site and was a bit shy about posting my comments.
i really couldn't click away without saying anything about this piece though.
What a read in the early afternoon!
Outside is almost raining and i feel like i can't rely on anything. Everything outside my head could not be real.
And then, out of the blue, your piece. To remind me that the brain is something that follows some kind of logic.
Clear enough to be understood but not so that it could be seen as patronizing.
Anyway, my comments are terrible.
Should give up.
Faye
Re: The Mind's I
Nothing terrible about that comment. I'm delighted that you got something out of the article and thought it was pitched about right. Welcome to the site. you'll find peiople are delighted to get comments, even quite critical ones if they are offered in a helpful and constructive way. Don't be shy, say what you think. That's what I do.
Re: The Mind's I
I do understand you, indeed, David it is.
Re: The Mind's I
I'm sorry sirat, I read to half way through, I just couldn't get to grips with it . I understand what you were trying to perceive and it did make me think, but I just couldn't quite get into it and unfortunately didn't finish reading this piece, just went on to read other great stories you have written.
Re: The Mind's I
I totally understand. I've always been drawn to philosophical ideas and also to ideas about artificial intelligence, and this was just something I wanted to get out of my system and share with like-minded people. I can see completely that it wouldn't be to everyone's taste. Thanks for reading part of iot anyway!
Re: The Mind's I
I read the first four or five paragraphs and I decided to print it and read very carefully the whole piece later today. I'll be back because this is an interesting article and perhaps I have some interesting ideas to share.
Re: The Mind's I
Looking forward to hearing what you have to say. And many thanks for the "hot author" nomination.
Re: The Mind's I
Now after reading your article more than two times first of all I must admit it's very well written and objective.
I'm interested in the Asynchronous thing.
The brain of a human being is the brain of a human being. Can the brain of a human being understand anything beyond the brain of a human being? This may sound silly or mad. We have not understood our own Intelligence or how our own brain works, so how can we create similar brains?
We can create AI according to our current understanding of Intelligence, what if our understanding of Intelligence is not complete or what if it's false? What kind of brains would come out from a creator's mind that doesn't know if Intelligence is A or B? And even if we find out that Intelligence is A or B, what we would create is As or Bs and nothing else. How can that possibly help us to expand our knowledge?
The electromagnetic theory is a step, the other theories in my opinion are as good as any other 'model'.
There is electromagnetism (and various waves etc) in a human brain. Electromagnetism can affect a human brain a lot, why? because perhaps Electromagnetism is part of the equilibrium of the vital functions of a brain.
We must understand that in such matters science has to go hand-in-hand with self-awareness, I cannot be persuaded that a scientist that is not practising any kind of esoterism (no matter how 'scientifically' he does it) can understand how his mind's I works, or what is his mind's I.
Furthermore, there is another very important thing, which is called aura.
Basically what exactly scientists are trying to create? super brains? or better brains? or usable brains? I believe that the better a brain gets the more conscious it becomes, and the more conscious it becomes the more independent it wants to be.
AI and the creation of human clones, as well as the Exoselves and the super-beings or should I say super-humans that some scientists want to create or make themselves are in fact the biggest moral dilemma ever and the last temptation of humanity.
Men try to find things that are 'outside themselves' whereas they should be trying to find what is inside. Men believe that this is the only world, a physical world to be perceived by physical organs.
If there is a quality in our human brains that exists beyond the physical world we won't be able to see this quality if we don't believe in its existence. And I believe that Intelligence is part of this quality, so I believe that most scientists are completely wrong if not ridiculous when they speak about AI or Exoselves or SuperHumans.
I'd better stop right here. I want to repeat that this is a well written article and add that it is a very informative and rewarding read.
Well done Sirat.
Silent
Re: The Mind's I
Thanks very much Silent. You have certainly given me a lot ot come back on there. It would take another article to reply to all of it. If I take one or two points:
"Can the brain of a human being understand anything beyond the brain of a human being?"
This is a very interesting and pivotal question in the design of artificial intelligence algorithms. If we have to design the whole thing from scratch, I agree we probably can't do it. But what we perhaps can do is set in motion the same kind of process which brought about our own intelligence, viz. an evolutionary process. We can perhaps create self-correcting programmes which improve themselves as a result of their interaction with the world. These programmes will evolve intelligence, probably very quickly after a particular take-off point is reached. Hence even if our understanding of the nature of intelligence is imperfect, evolution of this new electronic kind will take care of the details. That was exactly the plot of my novel "SIRAT". Once the thing has got going it passes beyond human understanding very quickly. It is literally the next stage in the evolution of mind. We are only the launch pad for this new manifestation of consciousness in the universe. The human era will one day give way to another, different era. That is the argument. The creation of electronic consciousness may indeed be what you have called "the last temptation of humanity".
Moving on, the electromagnetic account of consciousness I think is the least persuasive because the strength of the electromagnetic fields generated in the brain is simply too feeble. The quantum field theory looks far more promising. But there may be no need to go beyond the perfectly straightforward computational theory. Which one turns out to be correct however is really only a technicality, consciousness can probably be reproduced in electronic systems whichever one it is. I don't think there is anything special about biological systems that makes them the only possible host for consciousness.
One last point. You consider the possibility: "If there is a quality in our human brains that exists beyond the physical world", and this is of course the whole crux of my article. Does "beyond the physical world" imply souls? Miracles? Magic? Or is quantum existence sufficiently "beyond" to fit the bill? The tradition has been to presume that there is something supernatural about consciousness. I disagree, I think it will turn out to be explicable within the same set of natural laws that explain the rest of the world. If you don't make that assumption there is little point in even starting the investigation, you have ruled out the possibility of solving your problem. And as someone with the "soul" of a scientist I find that unacceptable.
Many thanks once again for all the thought you have put into your comments.
Re: The Mind's I
Oh, I've just noticed. Many thanks to whoever nominated this for a future anthology. Extraordinarily kind of you!